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Abstract—In traditional Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking (PAEB) system, vehicles equipped with onboard sensors such as radar, 
camera, and infrared detect pedestrians, alert the driver and/ or automatically take actions to prevent vehicle-pedestrian collision. In some 
situations, a vehicle may not be able to detect a pedestrian due to blind spots. Such a vehicle could benefit from the sensor data from 
neighboring vehicles in making such safety critical decisions. We propose a trust model for ensuring shared data are valid and trustworthy 
for use in making safety critical decisions. Simulation results of the proposed trust model show promise. 
 




In traditional Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking 
(PAEB) system, vehicles equipped with onboard sensors such as 
radar, camera, and infrared detect pedestrians, alert the driver 
and/ or automatically take actions to prevent vehicle-pedestrian 
collision. In some situations, such as shown in Figure 1, the 
sensors of the black sedan may not detect the pedestrian which 
could result in a crash. However, if the vehicles in the scenario 
shared sensor information in a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) 






















Fig. 1: Crash Scenario due to an obstruction in the middle 
(Courtesy: Dr. S. Chien, S. R. Bhatnagar and TASI Simulator) 
 
In V2V communication, every transceiver device involved sends 
data such as pedestrian crossing, toll gate and accidents to other 
transceiver devices. Constraints such as the networkQuality of 
Service, the quality of vehicle sensors and the overall system 
directly impact the quality of the exchanged data. These messages 
are used in making critical decisions such as slowing down to 
avoid a collision with a pedestrian. As such, the validity of these 
messages play an important role in making safety critical 
decisions. For example, questions such as are the messages 




same pedestrian, or are they referring to an object by the roadside 
need to be  
addressed. 
In this paper, we attempt to contribute to the area of V2V-
PAEB research by focusing on trust in such a V2V-PAEB system. 
We propose a trust model to quantify trust for communications in 
a V2V-PAEB system. Our model filters incoming messages, 
evaluates trustworthiness and forwards the messages, along with 
their quantified trust data, for safety decisions to be made 
upstream. Our trust model can be seamlessly integrated with the 
Transportation Active Safety Institute (TASI) computer 
simulation at IUPUI TASI lab. Communications between the 
vehicles can be secured with appropriate authentication and 
encryption technologies recommended by Vehicular Ad hoc 
network (VANET) standardization bodies, therefore we assume 
the presence of secure communication channels between vehicles. 
2. RELATED WORK 
In [1], the authors present a reputation assisted trust 
management mechanism for VANET using trusted group 
formation. The formed group manager has the privilege to change 
the trust value of the vehicle dynamically based on its behavior in 
the network. Government vehicles are chosen to be the pre-
trusted vehicles and they act as group manager. Vehicles securely 
form groups following a set of sequential steps: setup, join, sign, 
verify and open. The trust levels are of two types: static and 
dynamic reputation. Static trust increases/decreases based on the 
reputation of received messages, dynamic trust on the other hand, 
increases/decreases based on the source vehicle’s behavior, and 
reputation of its messages received via other vehicles. The notion 
of a group manager implies that there must be a group manager 
present in any given time in order to establish a formation. This 
raises scalability issues. In our proposed system, each vehicle 
makes its own trust assessment rather than rely on a neighbor to 
make it for them. 
Liao et. al. [2] propose a centralized trust management scheme 
based on incident reports. The central authority (such as a 
Regional Traffic Management Center) monitors all vehicles in the 
network for incident detection. Trust values areupdated based on 
incident, and periodically broadcasted to all vehicles. Messages 
received in V2V communications are vetted against these reports 
to determine their trustworthiness. The main drawback of this 
method is, it misses a dynamic real-time trust component. 
Although the incident reports contain reputation data, the 
coordinating vehicles are in a constant dynamic environment and 
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require a real-time evaluation of trust in addition to the reputation 
data. Our proposed system incorporates both real-time and 
reputation trust components to evaluate an aggregate trust. 
The authors in [3] propose an announcement based scheme in 
which vehicles provide feedback to the messages received and 
build reputation score based on them. The system includes a 
reputation server which collects feedback and broadcasts 
reputation data on the network. This means that the vehicles 
which are not in close proximity with each other but within reach 
of the same reputation server would receive the broadcast, 
wasting storage space and bandwidth. Our system requests data 
on demand from a remote reputation server. 
3. TRUST MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Trust is a subjectiveconcept as indicated in [4]. It is a relationship 
existing between two participants. [5] defines trust as: 
 
“Trust is the willingness of the trustor (evaluator) to take risk on a 
subjective belief that a trustee (evaluatee) will exhibit reliable 
behavior to maximize the trustors interest under uncertainty (e.g. 
ambiguity due to conflicting evidence and /or ignorance caused 
by complete lack of evidence) of a given situation based on the 
cognitive assessment of past experience with the trustee” 
 
For example, in human associations, we trust other people based 
on our past experiences with them and we are able to rely on such 
experiences to believe that they will exhibit reliable behavior in 
unfamiliar or ambiguous situations. On the contrary, if we distrust 
someone, then we believe we cannot assume that they will exhibit 
reliable behavior under such conditions. It is important to note 
that trust is contextual and constantly evolving.   For example, a 
trusted person can exhibit reliable behavior in one scenario but 
unreliable behavior in a different context (e.g. trusting Bob as a 
good math teacher, but a bad basketball player). Also if we have 
trusted Alice with a credit card and end up with unknown 
charges, our trust for her with respect to this context will reduce. 
It is in this context that we propose a trust model for the V2V 
application. 
The authors of [6] describe a trust management system as a 
framework designed to help make better decisions based on trust 
information. As shown in Figure 2 they model trust management 
system as four interacting components: trust modeling, trust 
inference and trust decision, and the applicable context [6]. 
This (Figure 2) trust model deals with how to represent trust in 
computational models using available raw data.  
Fig. 2: Trust Management System (Redrawn from [6]) 
 
Discrete andcontinuous numerical valuesare usually usedto 
quantitatively measure trust in many applications [5]. Sometimes 
there is the need to aggregate trust from various participants in 
order to infer trust between two parties. There are two important 
operators in trust reference schemes: transitivity operator and 
aggregation operator [7]. Transitivity operator is used to calculate 
trust propagation in a single chain. Aggregation operator on the 
other hand, is used for combining parallel trust paths between the 
truster and the trustee in the case where there exist more than one 
trust path between them [8]. 
The last component of the trust model is decision making. This 
is where a decision is made based on the evaluated trust between 




4. PROPOSED TRUST MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
FORV2V-PAEB 
 
We model trust as a continuous numerical value in the range [0 
1]. Zero (0) represents complete distrust and one (1) represents 
complete trust. We compute a trust value for each sensor data 
received in messages from neighboring vehicles. Each message 
contains one or more sensor data. There are three trust 
components involved, we call these, measured trust, short-term 
reputation, and long-term reputation as shown in Figure 4. These 
three components are then aggregated to achieve the resultant 
trust used in the V2V-PAEB decision logic. Figure 3 shows the 
data flow relationship between our trust model and the TASI 
V2V-PAEB simulation environment. Messages from the 
environmental model are processed by the transformation model 
which transforms all sensor values onto a common reference 
frame. Our trust model then computes a trust value for each 
message and forwards the messages, along with their quantified 
trust data, for safety decisions to be made by the V2V-PAEB 
control model. 
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Fig. 4: Proposed Trust Model for V2V-PAEB 
parts, first a value based on a known sensor profile, and thena 
value based on the error probability in the measured raw data. 
This model is contextual and dependent on the type of sensor and 
quantity being measured. For example, a typical profile for a 
sensor that measures a pedestrian’s position would include 
reasonable lower and upper limits in the measured value. A lower 
limit can be selected as zero feet from the  
 
subject vehicle in the same plane as the direction of  
travel. An upper limit can also be selected as ‘x’ feet (based on 
the speed of the subject vehicle) in the same plane as the  
 
direction of travel. A value outside this range, for example, 
positiondata which indicates a pedestrian above or below the 
plane of travel would suggest a failed sensor and hence, be  
 
deemed untrustworthy and therefore, not considered in making 
control decisions. This serves to filter out outliers from the 
analysis. In a rare situation where all messages are declared 
failed, it will be up to the V2V-PAEB control logic to decide 
which safety action to take. Each sensor can have as many 
profiles as can be constructed. The other part of the measured 
trust is based on measurement error in the physical quantity. 
Heuristic models such as Bayesian point-estimation techniques 
can be used to estimate the error involved in measurements. The 
results of these analyses are then be mapped onto a trust plane. 
2) Short Term Reputation: Here we maintain a local historical 
trust value for each vehicle we receive messages from. If a 
message is not received from a given vehicle after some 
predefined time, for example if it is no longer within range, it is 
dropped from this historical list. Each trust value is based on 
short-term history of decisions made by the V2V-PAEB control 
logic. This requires feedback from the V2V-PAEB control logic. 
For this to be feasible, the V2V-PAEB control system must be 
able to perform an inverse operation to map the output decision 
back onto the contributing vehicles. This inverse operation is 
problematic since the consequence of the control decision is 
binary (collision, or no collision). Therefore, we adopted a 
simpler universal approach where the short-term trust values of 
all involving vehicles are penalized (i.e., assigned a default reset 
value) when a collision results from a control decision. On the 
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other hand, when collision is avoided, all involving vehicles are 
rewarded with a boost in their short-term trust values (i.e., trust 
values incremented by a fixed amount). The reward value 
depends on the minimum number of in-profile messages that must 
be received in order for a message to achieve its full trust 
potential. Sample selection of penalty and reward values will be 
described inSection V. This trust component is periodically 
uploaded remotely to update a long-term reputation. 
 
3) Long Term Reputation: Vehicles equipped with a V2V-
PAEB system would periodically establish a secure connection 
with a reputation server (via LTE/4G/5G) in the cloud, and 
upload short term reputation trust values. These historical trust 
data would be used to estimate a reputation value for each kind of 
vehicle.  
 
4) Trust Aggregation: The three trust components are then 
aggregated to provide a single trust value for each sensor value 
used for decision making. We adopted a simple weighted additive 
aggregation scheme.  
V. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
For simplicity, pedestrian position data from a single sensor is 
considered for demonstration purposes. A simple range-check is 
used as a profile for the sensor (in a real-world application, there 
would be various data from different sensor sources, that would 
require different sensor profiles) that is, the Euclidean norm of 
each sensor value from each vehicle must fall within a certain 
reasonable range to be deemed trust-worthy. When a sensor 
values falls outside the accept-able range, it is marked as 
untrustworthy and automatically assigned a trust value of 0. 
When a signal falls within the profile, it moves on to the error 
analysis. Here, we used the Euclidean distance from the mean of 
the signals as an error measure. That is, the farther away from the 
mean, the less trust we assign to the signal, the closer it is, the 
more we trust the signal. We assign a trust value of 1 to the mean, 
and 0.5 to the signal farthest away from the mean. Note that 0.5 is 
the default trust assigned to each signal that falls within the 
profile. We linearly interpolate any trust values in-between these 
two limits. 
A short-term reputation model models the interactions be-tween 
the output of the V2V-PAEB simulation and the trust model. If a 
control decision does not result in a vehicle-pedestrian collision, 
the trust value for all vehicles involved is increased by a small 
value (0.1), i.e., five in-profile messages must be received from a 
particular sensor to achieve its maximum short-term reputation 
value (0.5). If a collision resulted from a control decision, all 
vehicles get a default short-term reputation value of zero. 
A fixed trust value of 0.5 was assigned as long-term reputation 
trust value for all messages. A more complex long-term 
reputation model will be implemented as a future extension. 
The trust values from all there models are weighted and 
aggregated into a single trust value to be sent to the V2V-PAEB 
simulation control model. 
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
The simulation consists of messages from three vehicles. For 
demonstration purposes, only a single sensor type was used. This 
could be say, the position of velocity of a pedestrian as measured 


































(b) Aggregate Trust vs Time 
 
Fig. 5: Aggregate Trust for In-Profile Messages 
 
analysis are assumed to have been transformed to 
acommonreference by the TASI simulation environment 
downstream of the trust model as described in Section IV. 
Figure 5 shows the nominal case where each of the messages 
fall within profile. That is, messages received by the subject 
vehicle from its neighbors contain sensor data whose Euclidean 
norm falls within the measured quantity’s predefined profile 
(lower and upper bounds) as shown in Figure 5(a). All the 
messages passed the profile check and therefore are used in the 
signal estimation. The result shows an aggregate trust values 
which convergence for all three messages after a few seconds as 
shown in Figure 5(b). The trust value of each message depends on 
how far the content of each individual message deviates from the 
estimated mean of the contents of all three messages. 
The second result, Figure 6, shows the behavior of aggregate trust 
when a message fails the profile check. The Euclidean norm of 
the data in message (vehicle 2), Figure 6, at time t = 1.4s 
exceeded the upper limit of the profile. This resulted in that 
particular message being dropped from further analysis 
downstream. It can be observed that its aggregate trust value 
drops to zero (distrust) following an  
(a) Euclidean Norm of Message Content vs Time 
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the trust analysis. 
If the signal falls back in-profile,its aggregate trust value 
gradually increases and settles if it stays in-profile. That is, we 
have to be cautious not to trust a particular sensor immediately 
following an out-of-profile event since that’s usually an 
indication of a degraded sensor and a precursor to complete 
sensor failure. 
The final result shows how the aggregate trust of all in-profile 
contributing messages would behave after a collision event. 
Figure 7 shows that the aggregate trust value for all messages 
falls to a predefined penalized default value following a collision 
event at time t = 0.8s. The significance of this scenario is that it 
penalizes the reputation of all contributing vehicles and their 
short-term and long-term reputation would be updated with lower 
trust values following a collision event. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE EXTENSIONS 
We have proposed a trust model which estimates trust in V2V-
PAEB communications. Sensor profiles are used to screen 
messages from inclusion in safety decisions. Error probability 
models are used to estimate signal error and assign trust 
accordingly (measured trust), which is aggregated with a short-
term reputation and long-term reputation to get an aggregate trust 
for use in V2V-PAEB control logic. 
This work is an early attempt to solving the trust problem in 
V2V-PAEB communications. Integrating this model with 
theTASI simulation environment would be helpful in determining 
the performance of this model. Future work would involve 
refinements such as using robust estimation techniques for sensor 
profile checking, and modeling profiles for complex sensors. The 
detailed workings of the long-term reputation model is also left as 



















































(b) Aggregate Trust vs Time 
 
Fig. 7: Aggregate Trust for a Collision Event  
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